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Abstract
How does one allocate a collection of resources to a set of strategic agents in a fair and
efficient manner without using money? For in many scenarios it is not feasible to use money
to compensate agents for otherwise unsatisfactory outcomes. This paper studies this question,
looking at both fairness and efficiency measures.
• We employ the proportionally fair solution, which is a well-known fairness concept for
money-free settings. But although finding a proportionally fair solution is computation-
ally tractable, it cannot be implemented in a truthful fashion. Consequently, we seek
approximate solutions. We give several truthful mechanisms which achieve proportional
fairness in an approximate sense. We use a strong notion of approximation, requiring the
mechanism to give each agent a good approximation of its proportionally fair utility. In
particular, one of our mechanisms provides a better and better approximation factor as
the minimum demand for every good increases. A motivating example is provided by the
massive privatization auction in the Czech republic in the early 90s.
• With regard to efficiency, prior work has shown a lower bound of 0.5 on the approximation
factor of any swap-dictatorial mechanism approximating a social welfare measure even for
the two agents and multiple goods case. We surpass this lower bound by designing a non-
swap-dictatorial mechanism for this case. Interestingly, the new mechanism builds on the
notion of proportional fairness.
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1 Introduction
How does one allocate a collection of resources to a set of strategic agents in a fair and efficient
manner without using money? This is a fundemental problem with many applications since in
many scenarios payments cannot be solicited from agents; for instance, different teams compete for
a set of shared resources in a firm, and the firm cannot solicit payments from the teams to make
allocation decisions. Despite the applicability of mechanism design without money, much of the
work in this area relies on enforcing payments. Motivated by this, we study the above question in
this paper. We look at both fairness and efficiency measures.
One practical issue that arises in mechanism design without money is to put the utilities of the
agents on a common scale. For example, happiness could mean different things to different people
and cannot be compared as such. When payments can be used, a standard approach is to measure
the utilites in terms of money. In the absence of money, one way to overcome this difficulty is to
look for scale-free solutions, i.e., if an agent scales her valuations up or down, the solution should
remain the same. When maximizing social welfare (SW), one can achieve this by first normalizing
the values of the agents so that they add up to a common number (1 say) and then maximizing
the welfare with these normalized values. For the case of fairness, the proportionally fair solution
is a well-known fairness concept that is scale-free. In brief, a proportionally fair (PF) solution is
a Pareto optimal solution O which compares favorably to any other Pareto optimal solution O′ in
the sense that when switching from O′ to O, percentage gains outweigh percentage losses. The PF
solution was first proposed in the TCP literature and is used widely in many practical scenarios [12].
Maximizing social welfare with normalized values using truthful mechanisms was first studied
by Guo and Conitzer [9]. They studied the mechanism design for the special case of two players
and many items to better understand the structure of good mechanisms maximizing social welfare.
Even in this special case, they showed that the problem is difficult by proving that no mechanism
from a general class called increasing-price mechanisms that use artificial currency can yield better
than 0.5 approximation; they left it as an open question to overcome this bound. Later on, Han et
al. [10] showed the same negative result of 0.5 for an even more general class of mechanisms called
swap-dictatorial1 mechanisms. In this work, we break this bound of 0.5. Our main contribution
here is to show a connection between the PF and SW allocations; then we exploit this connection
to give an interesting non-swap-dictatorial mechanism which overcomes the 0.5 bound.
We then focus on the design of truthful mechanisms for achieving proportional fairness. Even
for simple instances involving just two agents and two items, it is not difficult to show that no
truthful mechanism can obtain a PF solution in general. Hence one has to look for approximate
solutions. In this work, we ask for a strong notion of approximation requiring the mechanism to
give each agent a good approximation of its true proportionally fair utility.
Also, we note that the PF solution is related to the market equilibrium prices when agents are
assumed to each have a unit budget of some artificial currency. In this case, the PF allocation is
the same as the allocation at market equilibrium prices, and is captured via the Eisenberg-Gale
program [8, 7, 11]. This connection of the PF solution to market equilibrium prices is of independent
interest for the design of truthful mechanisms in this setting.
A specific real world example of the use of artificial currency for achieving or approximating
1This class contains all mechanisms that (randomly) choose one of the two bidders and allow her to choose her
preferred bundle of items from a predefined set; the other bidder receives the remaining items. For further discussion
on swap-dictatorial mechanisms and their importance in money-free mechanism design, see [9] and references therein.
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fair outcomes, which motivates our final result, is that of the privatization auctions that took place
in Czechoslovakia. In the early 90s, the Czech government sought to privatize the state owned
firms dating from the then recently ended communist era. The government’s goal was two-fold —
first to distribute shares of these companies to their citizens in a fair manner and to calculate the
market prices of these companies so that the shares could be traded in the open market after the
initial allocation. To this end, they ran an auction, as described in [1]. Citizens could choose to
participate by buying 1000 vouchers at a cost of 1,000 Czech Crowns, about $35, a fifth of the
average monthly salary. Over 90% of those eligible participated. These vouchers were then used
to bid for shares in the available 1,491 firms. We believe that the PF allocation provides a very
appropriate solution for this example, both to calculate a fair allocation and to compute market
prices. Our mechanism solves the problem of efficiently discovering approximately PF allocations
in a truthful fashion for such natural scenarios where there is high demand for each resource.
Our results. We start in Section 3 with the goal of (approximately) maximizing the social welfare
using truthful mechanisms. Previous work showed that no non-trivial approximation factors can
be achieved by any truthful mechanism for unbounded numbers of items and bidders [10]. This
work also showed that no swap-dictatorial mechanism can yield an approximation factor better
than the trivial 0.5 for the two-bidder case. Accordingly, the authors asked whether a truthful
mechanism breaking this bound of 0.5 exists. We give a positive answer by designing a truthful
non-swap-dictatorial mechanism closely related to the notion of PF, and proving that it achieves
an approximation factor of at least 0.622.
In Section 4, we consider the objective of (approximately) maximizing the fraction of her PF
utility that each bidder receives. Subsection 4.1 studies the set of instances involving just two items,
for which we present a truthful mechanism which guarantees that all bidders will receive exactly
the same fraction of their PF utility; this fraction is always at least n
n+1 , where n is the number
of bidders. For small values of n, we also describe more elaborate mechanisms achieving better
approximation ratios: 0.828 instead of 2/3 for n = 2 and 0.775 instead of 3/4 for n = 3, both of
which appear in Appendix B. Then, in Subsection 4.2, we address the general setting with arbitrary
numbers of bidders and items. We present a truthful mechanism that performs increasingly well as
the PF prices2 increase. More specifically, if p∗j is the PF price of item j, then the approximation
factor guaranteed by this mechanism is equal to minj
(
p∗j/
⌈
p∗j
⌉)
. It is interesting to note that
scenarios such as the privatization auction mentioned above involve a number of bidders much
larger than the number of items; as a rule, we expect this to lead to high prices and a very good
approximation of the participants’ PF utilities.
Related Work. Our setting is closely related to the large topic of fair division or cake-cutting [2,
16], which has been studied since the 1940’s, using the [0, 1] interval as the standard representation
of a cake. Each agent’s preferences take the form of a valuation function over this interval and the
valuations of unions of subintervals are additive. The multiple divisible items setting that we focus
on is equivalent to restricting the agents’ valuations to piecewise constant functions over the [0, 1]
interval. Some of the most common notions of fairness that have been studied in this literature
are, proportionality, envy-freeness, and equitability [2, 16].3
2The prices induced by the market equilibrium when all bidders have a unit of budget.
3It is worth distinguishing the notion of PF from that of proportionality by noting that the latter is a much weaker
notion, directly implied by the former. Also, note that all the mechanisms that we propose yield envy-free outcomes.
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Despite the extensive work on fair resource allocation, truthfulness considerations have not
played a major role in this literature. Most results related to truthfulness were weakened by
the assumption that each agent would be truthful in reporting its valuations unless this strategy
was dominated. Very recent work [5, 13, 18] studies truthful cake cutting variations using the
standard notion of truthfulness according to which an agent may not be truthful unless doing so
is a dominant strategy. Chen et al. [5] study truthful cake-cutting with agents having piecewise
uniform valuations and they provide a polynomial-time mechanism that is truthful, proportional,
and envy-free. They also design randomized mechanisms for more general families of valuation
functions, while Mossel and Tamuz [13] prove the existence of truthful (in expectation) mechanisms
satisfying proportionality in expectation for general valuations. Zivan et al. [18] aim to achieve envy-
free Pareto optimal allocations of multiple divisible goods while reducing, but not eliminating, the
agents’ incentives to lie. The extent to which untruthfulness is reduced by their proposed mechanism
is only evaluated empirically and depends critically on their assumption that the resource limitations
are soft constraints. Our work is closely related to the recent papers of Guo and Conitzer [9] and
of Han et al. [10], who also consider the truthful allocation of multiple divisible goods; their goal is
to maximize the social welfare (We provide more details in Section 3).
Most of the papers mentioned above contribute to our understanding of the trade-offs between
either truthfulness and fairness, or truthfulness and social welfare. Another direction that has been
actively pursued is to understand and quantify the interplay between fairness and social welfare.
Caragiannis et al. [4] measured the deterioration of the social welfare caused due to different fairness
restrictions, the price of fairness. More recently, Cohler et al. [6] designed algorithms for computing
allocations that (approximately) maximize social welfare while satisfying envy-freeness.
Our results fit into the general agenda of approximate mechanism design without money, explic-
itly initiated by Procaccia et al. [15]. The use of artificial currency aiming to achieve truthfulness
and fairness in such scenarios, and the notion of competitive equilibrium with equal incomes was
recently revisited by Budish [3] and Budish et al. [14].
Finally, the work of Zhang [17], despite the fact that it does not explicitly refer to the use of
artificial currency, enforces that all the participants’ budgets be spent, thus moving to an equivalent
scenario. Unlike our work, they focus on evaluating the equilibrium points of the resource allocation
game rather than on designing truthful mechanisms.
2 Preliminaries
Let M denote the set of m items and N the set of n bidders. Each bidder i ∈ N has a valuation
vij for each item j ∈M and each item is divisible, meaning that it can be cut into arbitrarily small
pieces and then allocated to different bidders. The bidder valuations are scaled so that
∑
j vij = 1
for each bidder i.
Let x be an allocation of the resources among the bidders and vi(x) be the valuation of bidder
i for this allocation. Such an allocation is Proportionally Fair (PF) if it is feasible, and for any
other feasible allocation x′ the aggregate proportional change to the valuations is not positive, i.e.:
∑
i∈N
vi(x
′)− vi(x)
vi(x)
≤ 0.
We focus on problems where every bidder has additive linear valuations; this means that, if a
bidder is allocated a fraction fj of each item j that she values at vj , then her valuation for that
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allocation will be
∑
j fjvj. For such additive linear valuations we can compute a PF allocation in
polynomial time by assuming that each bidder has a unit budget of some artificial currency and
then using the Eisenberg-Gale convex program to compute the market equilibrium of the induced
market [7, 11]. This outcome need not be unique, but it provides unique item prices and achieved
bidder valuations [8]; we will refer to these induced item prices as PF prices.
Given a valuation bid vector from each bidder (one bid for each item), we want to design
mechanisms that output an allocation of items to bidders. We restrict ourselves to truthful mecha-
nisms, i.e. mechanisms such that any false bid from a bidder will never return her a more valuable
allocation. In designing such mechanisms we consider two objectives:
• The SW objective, which aims to output an allocation x (approximately) maximizing the
social welfare, denoted SW (x) =
∑
i vi(x).
• The PF objective, which aims to output an allocation x (approximately) maximizing the value
of ρ(x) = mini∈N
(
vi(x)
vi(xPF )
)
, where xPF denotes the PF allocation.
Since maximizing these objectives via truthful mechanisms is infeasible in our setting, we will
measure the performance of our mechanisms based on the extent to which they approximate them.
More specifically, when referring to an approximation factor for the SW objective, this will be the
minimum value of the ratio SW (x)/SW (x∗) across all the relevant problem instances, where x is
the output of the mechanism and x∗ is the allocation that maximizes SW. For the PF objective
the approximation factor will be the minimum value of ρ(x) across all relevant instances.
3 Social Welfare Approximation
The problem of maximizing the SW objective in this model was first approached by Guo and
Conitzer [9], who focused on the interesting case of two-bidder instances, which often draws the
attention of researchers studying efficient or fair allocation. They first showed that no truthful
mechanism can achieve better than a 0.841 approximation of the optimal social welfare, even for
two items. They then studied a subclass of swap-dictatorial mechanisms and showed that no
mechanism from that subclass can achieve better than a 0.5 approximation of the optimal social
welfare when m, the number of items, is unbounded. Subsequent work of Han et al. [10] extended
these negative results, showing that no swap-dictatorial mechanism can achieve better than a 0.5
approximation for the two-bidder case, and that for the general setting with n > 2, no truthful
mechanism can achieve better than the trivial 1/m approximation. The main open question that
remains in this setting is whether interesting truthful mechanisms for the two-bidder case exist
beyond the class of swap-dictatorial mechanisms and whether such mechanisms can achieve an
approximation factor better than 0.5.
We provide a positive answer to both open questions using the notion of PF as a tool. We first
show that, for two-bidder instances, PF allocations approximate the SW objective very efficiently,
even in the worst case. We then give two truthful mechanisms, one of which is inherently connected
to the PF allocation, and show that combining the two gives a 0.622 approximation of the SW
objective, beating the lower bound of 0.5 that was shown in [10] for all swap-dictatorial mechanisms.
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3.1 The Social Welfare of Proportionally Fair Allocations
We start by showing that for two agents A,B, and multiple items, the social welfare of the PF
allocation xPF is a very good approximation of the social welfare achieved by x
∗, the optimal
allocation. Specifically:
Theorem 1. For two agents and multiple items, SW (xPF )
SW (x∗) ≥ 2
√
3+3
4
√
3
≈ 0.933.
Proof. Assume that the items are ordered in a decreasing fashion w.r.t. the
vAj
vBj
ratio. It is easy to
verify that x∗ allocates each item j either to agent A, or to agent B, depending on whether vAj or
vBj is larger. We assume that items valued equally by both are allocated to agent B, so x
∗ can be
thought of as defining an item e in the ordering mentioned above such that all the items preceding
item e are allocated to agent A and all the rest to agent B. This type of “frontier” within this
ordering, defining each player’s allocation, actually occurs with all Pareto efficient allocations, so
the PF allocation also defines such a frontier4. W.l.o.g. we assume that, in the items’ ordering, the
frontier of PF comes before the frontier of the social welfare maximizing allocation.
These two frontiers separate the set of items into three groups. Slightly abusing notation, let
vAg and vBg denote the valuations of agents A and B respectively for group g ∈ {1, 2, 3}, where
the group number g is consistent with the initial item ordering. Note that vA1/vB1 ≥ vA2/vB2, and
vA2/vB2 ≥ vA3/vB3. The ratio that we are studying can thus be rewritten as follows:
SW (xPF )
SW (x∗)
=
vA1 + vB2 + vB3
vA1 + vA2 + vB3
= 1− vA2 − vB2
vA1 + vA2 + vB3
. (1)
Let vA2 = kvB2 for some k > 1. Then, vA1 ≥ kvB1. Thus k(vB1 + vB2) ≤ vA1 + vA2 ≤ 1, or
k(1 − vB3) ≤ 1, which yields that vB3 ≥ (k − 1)/k. Also, by the definition of PF, since the PF
solution allocates the second group of items to agent B, vA2
vA1
≤ vB2
vB2+vB3
which, after substituting
for vA2, yields vA1 ≥ k(vB2 + vB3). Since vB2 + vB3 = 1 − vB1, this inequality can be rewritten
as vA1 ≥ k(1 − vB1). Adding this inequality to vA1 ≥ kvB1 yields vA1 ≥ k/2. Using these lower
bounds for vA1 and vB3 in Equation (1), we get:
SW (xPF )
SW (x∗)
≥ 1− (k − 1)vB2
k
2 + kvB2 +
k−1
k
= 1− 2k(k − 1)vB2
2k2vB2 + k2 + 2k − 2 .
We can then show that for any value of vB2, the right hand side of the inequality is minimized
for k as large as possible, and that k is restricted to be at most 1
vB2+0.5
, implying that k = 1+
√
3
2 in
the worst case, thereby proving the theorem (details in Appendix A).
3.2 Two Truthful Mechanisms
Swap-Dictatorial Mechanism. Our first mechanism picks one of the two players with proba-
bility 12 , and then, based on her bid, provides her with her most preferred bundle of at most m/2
items. The other player is allocated everything that is left. Clearly, this mechanism is truthful
since a bidder would prefer to bid truthfully if picked, and her bid does not affect the allocation if
she is not picked. This mechanism achieves a 0.5 approximation: If v is some bidder’s valuation
4If the PF solution dictates that an item has to be shared between the two agents, we can just split it into two
items such that each one is allocated to a different agent; such a change does not affect the item ordering.
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for her allocated bundle if she is picked by the mechanism, then the least value that she receives if
she is not picked (and the other bidder is allocated her favorite bundle) is 1 − v. Therefore, both
bidders get an expected value of at least 0.5, yielding an expected social welfare of at least 1; the
optimal social welfare is of course at most 2. This is tight, as the following example shows: there
are 4 items valued by bidder A at (1 − 2ǫ, ǫ, ǫ/2, ǫ/2) and by Bidder B at (ǫ, 1 − 2ǫ, ǫ/2, ǫ/2), for
some small ǫ > 0; the mechanism achieves a 1/2 + Θ(ǫ) approximation. Finally, we note that we
can use a deterministic version of this mechanism: it plays this game twice, once with Bidder A as
the dictator and once with Bidder B in this role. Each game is played with a set comprising one
half of each original item.
Partial Allocation Mechanism. We now present an interesting non-swap-dictatorial truthful
mechanism which we call the Partial Allocation (PA) mechanism. Let vA = vA(xPF ) and vB =
vB(xPF ) denote respectively the fraction of their total valuation that Bidders A and B receive in the
PF allocation (remember that the total valuation is equal to 1). The mechanism allocates Bidder
A a fraction vB of each of the items in her PF allocation and, similarly, Bidder B a fraction vA of
each of the items in her PF allocation.5 Note that, as a direct implication, Bidder A’s utility is a vB
approximation of her PF utility and similarly Bidder B’s utility is a vA approximation. In contrast
to the previous mechanism, the types of instances for which this mechanism performs poorly are
the ones where, for example, both bidders value all items equally; this would cause both bidders to
receive only a 0.5 fraction of their PF allocation, a 0.5 approximation of the SW objective.
Lemma 1. The PA mechanism is truthful.
Proof. We show that Bidder A is truthful; the same argument applies to Bidder B. We rescale the
valuations of Bidder A so that her new valuation for the PF allocation is v¯A = vB . Suppose Bidder
A changes her bid and, in the changed PF allocation, gains allocation of value gA and loses value
lA, according to the scaled valuations. Let the gains and losses to Bidder B have values gB and lB .
Since v¯A = vB and given the definition of PF, we get lB ≥ gA and lA ≥ gB , for otherwise either
one of these shifts of allocation between A and B would have lead to a higher percentage increase
than decrease. The rescaled valuation of Bidder A after changing her bid would be:
(vB − lB + gB)(v¯A − lA + gA) = vB v¯A + vB(gA − lA) + v¯A(gB − lB) + (gB − lB)(gA − lA)
= vB [v¯A − (lA − gA)− (lB − gB)]− (gA − lA)(lB − gB)
= vB [v¯A − (lB − gA)− (lA − gB)]− (gA − lA)(lB − gB)
≤ vB v¯A − (gA − lA)(lB − gB).
Now, if gA ≥ lA, then as lB ≥ gA, and lA ≥ gB , it follows that lB ≥ gB ; thus the new valuation is
at most the original vB · v¯A. A similar argument applies if gB ≥ lB . Otherwise, gA ≤ lA and gB ≤ lB
and the reduction in value for Bidder A as is at least vB[(lA−gA)+(lB−gB)]+(gA− lA)(lB−gB) =
(lA − gA)[vB − (lB − gB)] + (lB − gB) ≥ 0, as lB ≤ vB .
3.3 The Hybrid Mechanism
We now provide a non-swap-dictatorial truthful mechanism that outperforms all swap-dictatorial
mechanisms, giving a 0.622 approximation of the SW objective. Our mechanism is a combination
5Like before, we can split an item into two in order to avoid any sharing of items in the PF allocation.
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of the swap-dictatorial mechanism and the PA mechanism described in the previous subsection. A
randomized version of it would run the swap-dictatorial mechanism with probability 0.5 and the PA
mechanism with the remaining 0.5 probability. Again, this can be implemented in a deterministic
fashion by spliting all items in half and using a different mechanism for each set of halves. The
benefit of combining them comes from the fact that one performs well when the other one does not.
Lemma 2. The hybrid mechanism outputs an allocation xm always satisfying
SW (xm)
SW (xPF )
≥ 23 .
Proof. (Sketch.) The swap-dictatorial mechanism always provides a social welfare of at least 1.
The PA mechanism provides a social welfare of 2vAvB . Thus,
SW (xm)
SW (xPF )
= 0.5+vAvB
vA+vB
. We show that
for all (vA, vB) ∈ [0.5, 1]2 this is minimized for vA = 0.5 and vB = 1 (details in Appendix A).
This lemma combined with Theorem 1 immediately implies:
Theorem 2. The hybrid mechanism always satisfies SW (xm)
SW (x∗) ≥ 0.933 · 23 ≈ 0.622.
4 Proportional Fairness Approximation
Despite the fact that maximizing social welfare is a very natural objective, one can quickly verify
that allocations that are very efficient in terms of social welfare can be very unfair to some bidders.
Dealing with problems such as the one that arose with the Czech privatization auctions [1] calls for
solutions that are fair. In what follows, we use the PF allocation as a benchmark for the “fair share”
that each bidder should be receiving and we aim to provide every bidder with a good approximation
of his value for that share. We start by focusing on the case of two items which helps build some
intuition for our solution to the general case that follows.
4.1 Two Items
Proportionally fair allocation for two items. For instances involving just two items t and
b (or top and bottom), for simplicity we choose one of the two items (w.l.o.g. b) and rescale the
valuations of each bidder so that they all have a valuation of 1 for item b. (If a bidder has zero
valuation for item b, then her valuation for item t is set to be ∞.) We then sort the bidders in
decreasing order of their valuation for item t (breaking ties arbitrarily). The proof of the following
lemma (in Appendix A) shows that for two-item instances there always exists a PF allocation such
that at most one bidder is allocated parts of both items. The proof also shows that if such a bidder
exists and her valuation for item t is v, then her valuation for the PF allocation will be v+1
n
. Such
a bidder will also be defining the relative value of the PF prices of the two items (the PF price of
t is v times that of b), so we will henceforth call her the Ratio Defining Bidder, denoted Rb.
Lemma 3. For two item instances, there always exists a PF allocation with at most one Rb.
Mechanism for many bidders and two items. In this scheme every bidder receives a fraction
of just one item. The mechanism can be thought of as a tie breaking rule that doesn’t allow the
existence of a bidder being allocated parts of more than one item. More specifically, given the
bidders’ bids, the mechanism computes a PF allocation with at most one Rb
6 and if one exists for
6This can be done by using binary search over the bidder ordering until Rb, if one exists, is found.
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that allocation, we instead force her to either equally share item t with the Top bidders or item
b with the Bottom bidders (respectively the bidders before and after Rb in the above ordering).
Among these two options, the mechanism chooses the one that maximizes Rb’s utility. Let ρ denote
the fraction of her PF utility that Rb receives. Every other bidder’s allocation is reduced as needed
so as to provide that same ρ fraction. We call this the Single Item (SI) mechanism.
Lemma 4. With n bidders, the SI mechanism achieves an approximation factor of n
n+1 .
Proof. The worst ρ occurs when Rb achieves the same utility with either option. If Rb is the k-th
bidder in the ordering, this means that she values being allocated 1/k of the top item equally with
1
n−k+1 of the bottom item, i.e.
v
k
= 1
n−k+1 , or v =
k
n−k+1 . The approximation factor then, on
substituting for v, is given by:
v/k
(v + 1)/n
=
1/(n − k + 1)
[(n+ 1)/(n − k + 1)]/n =
n
n+ 1
.
Lemma 5. The SI mechanism is truthful. (Proof in Appendix A.)
This mechanism performs really well as the number of bidders increases, but can be further
improved for small values of n. In Appendix B we present an interesting and more efficient mech-
anism for the special case of n = 2, which achieves an approximation factor of 0.828 instead of
2/3, and a similar mechanism for n = 3, achieving an approximation factor of 0.775 instead of 3/4.
As n increases beyond n = 3, such more elaborate schemes provide, at best, very modest gains
compared to the n
n+1 approximation mechanism presented above.
4.2 Many Bidders and Many Items
Using the intuition acquired from the two-item case, we now describe the Strong Demand Matching
mechanism (SDM) for the general case. Informally speaking, SDM provides every bidder with a
unit budget and then aims to discover item prices such that the demand of each bidder can be
satisfied using (a fraction of) just one item. This approach resembles the SI mechanism, but the
structure of the PF solution can now be much more complicated. This mechanism tackles the
problem of allocating a collection of goods for the very natural set of problem instances for which
the bidders may have arbitrary valuation functions, yet no item is undemanded if its price is low.
In what follows we describe the process by which SDM increases the prices of overdemanded items
in a fashion that maintains truthfulness and yields prices that are very close to the PF prices.
Let pj denote the price of item ej , and let the bang per buck that Bidder i gets from item ej
equal vij/pj. We say that item ej is an MBB item of Bidder i if Bidder i gets the maximum bang
per buck from that item7. For a given price vector p, let the demand graph D(p) be a bipartite
graph with bidders on one side and items on the other, such that an edge between Bidder i and
item ej exists if and only if ej is an MBB item of Bidder i. We call cj = ⌊pj⌋ the capacity of
item ej when its price is pj, and we say an assignment of bidders to items is valid if it matches
each bidder to at most one item and no item ej is matched to more than cj bidders. Given a
valid assignment A, we say an item ej is reachable from Bidder i if there exists an alternating
path (i, j1, i1, j2, i2, · · · , jk, ik, j) in the graph D(p) such that edges (i1, j1), · · · , (ik, jk) lie in the
7Note that for each bidder there could be multiple MBB items.
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assignment A. Finally, let d(R) be the collection of bidders with all their MBB items in set R.
The SDM mechanism initializes all item prices to pj = 1 and iterates as follows:
1. Find a valid assignment that maximizes the number of matched bidders.
If all the bidders are matched, conclude with Step 3.
2. Let U be the set of bidders who are not matched in Step 1.
Let R be the set of all items reachable from bidders in the set U .
Raise the price of each item ej in R from pj to x · pj,
where x ≥ 1 is the minimum value for which one of the following events takes place:
(a) The price of an item in R reaches an integral value. If this happens, repeat Step 1.
(b) For some bidder bi ∈ d(R), her set of MBB items increases, causing R to grow:
i. If for each item ej added to R, the number of bidders matched to it equals cj ,
continue with Step 2.
ii. If some item ej added to R has cj greater than the number of bidders matched to
it, continue with Step 1.
3. Every bidder matched to some item ej is allocated a fraction 1/pj of that item.
It remains to explain how to carry out Step 2. Set R can be found using a breadth-first-search like
algorithm. To determine when (a) is reached, we just need to know the smallest ⌈pj⌉/pj ratio over
all items whose price is being increased. For (b), we need to calculate, for each bidder in d(R), the
ratio of the bang per buck for her MBB items and for the items outside the set R.
Running time. If c(R) =
∑
j∈R cj denotes the total capacity in R, it is not difficult to see that
if U is non-empty, |d(R)| > c(R). Note that each time either event (a) or event (b)-ii occurs, c(R)
increases by at least 1, and thus, using the alternating path from a bidder in the set U to the
corresponding item, we can increase the number of matched bidders by at least 1; this means that
this can occur at most n times. The only other events are the unions resulting from (b)-i. There
can be at most min(n,m) of these, and they are followed by either Step (a) or (b)-ii. Thus there
are O(n ∗min(n,m)) iterations of Step (b)-i and O(n) iterations of Steps 1 and (b)-ii.
Correctness. Let p∗ be the PF prices and let q be the prices computed by the algorithm.
Lemma 6. Let f = maxj⌈p∗j⌉/p∗j . Then q ≤ fp∗.
Proof. First note that at prices fp∗, the MBB items for each bidder are the same as at prices p∗.
It is not difficult to see that at prices fp∗ every bidder can be allocated to exactly one item from
among her MBB items such that the number of bidders allocated to an item ej is less than or equal
to fp∗j . To show this, consider a PF allocation. Form the following graph on items and bidders
— add an edge between a bidder and an item if a portion of this item is assigned to this bidder
in the PF solution. If there exists a cycle in this graph, one can remove an edge in this cycle by
reallocating along the cycle while maintaining the utility of every bidder. Hence there is a PF
allocation in which this graph is a forest. Now for a given tree, root it at an arbitrary bidder. For
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each Bidder b in this tree, assign it to one of its child items, if any, and otherwise to its parent.
The result is that for each item ej , at most ⌈pj⌉ bidders will be assigned to it.
Now, suppose that some qj > fp
∗
j . Consider the first time t at which some price qi starts to
increase from fp∗i . Let S be the set of items ei whose price is currently fp
∗
i . We will show that no
item in set S will be part of the set R, and hence the prices of these items will not increase. Let
Tq and Tfp∗ be the sets of bidders who have edges to some item in the set S at the current prices
and at prices fp∗, respectively. Clearly Tq ⊆ Tfp∗ . Also suppose a bidder b ∈ Tfp∗ has an edge to
an item outside set S at prices fp∗; this means that b 6∈ Tq at the current prices as b will strictly
prefer the item outside the set S. Thus if b ∈ Tq, this implies that b has no edges outside the set
S at prices fp∗, and so b was allocated to some item in set S at prices fp∗. Since we know that at
prices fp∗ all the bidders can be allocated to some item, this implies that |Tq| ≤ c(S). Thus even
at current prices, all the bidders in Tq can be allocated to items in set S, and hence no item in set
S can be part of the set R.
Truthfulness. We argue by contradiction. Suppose that some Bidder b were not truthful in the
above algorithm, which we name algorithm A. First, we consider an alternate algorithm A′, and
show that it is a dominant strategy for b to be truthful in A′. Then we show that A and A′ produce
the same outcomes, and consequently b should also be truthful in A. A′ proceeds as follows. It
begins by running algorithm A but with b absent (the first run), yielding prices p′. Then it runs A
on all n bidders, but starting from prices p′ (the second run).
Lemma 7. b is truthful in algorithm A′.
Proof. Suppose the second run of the algorithm ends when b can be matched using an alternating
path that ends at an item e. Suppose at this point, the price of an item ej ∈ R is pj. It is easy to
see that bidder b has no incentives to lie to obtain an item that is not in R as the prices of these
items is completely defined by other bidders. Suppose that by lying, Bidder b is able to get an item
ej ∈ R at a price p′j < pj . Suppose that this happens with an alternating path that starts at b and
ends at some item e′. Now if this path existed in the truthful scenario when the price of item ej
reaches p′j, then even in the truthful scenario b would have been matched when the price of item
ej is p
′
j . Thus this path doesn’t exist in the truthful scenario when the price of item ej is p
′
j. But
why does this path not exist in the truthful scenario? It must be the case that some item on this
path has a higher price than the price in the lying scenario. A higher price on this item means that
in the truthful scenario item ej would have been matched via some alternating path ending at e
′
before the price of item ej reached p
′
j, a contradiction.
Lemma 8. A and A′ have the same outcome.
The proof of this Lemma is similar to that of Lemma 6 and is deferred to Appendix A.
Corollary 1. A is truthful.
Theorem 3. The SDM mechanism achieves an approximation factor of ρ = minj
(
p∗j/⌈p∗j⌉
)
. If
minj p
∗
j = k, this is an approximation factor of at least
k
k+1 .
Proof. If a bidder is allocated a portion of item ej , she receives a 1/qj fraction. But by Lemma 6,
1/qj ≥ 1/(fp∗j ) ≥ 1/⌈p∗j⌉. In value, her PF allocation equals a 1/p∗j fraction of item ej. Thus she
achieves an approximation factor of p∗j/⌈p∗j⌉. The result follows on minimizing over all bidders.
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A Omitted Proofs
of Theorem 1. Assume that the items are ordered in a decreasing fashion w.r.t. the
vAj
vBj
ratio. It
is easy to verify that x∗ allocates each item j either to agent A, or to agent B, depending on
whether vAj or vBj is larger. We assume that items valued equally by both are allocated to agent
B, so x∗ can be thought of as defining an item in the ordering mentioned above such that all
the items preceding this item are allocated to agent A and all the rest to agent B. This type of
“frontier” within this ordering, defining each player’s allocation, actually occurs with all Pareto
efficient allocations, so the PF allocation also defines such a frontier8. W.l.o.g. we assume that the
frontier of PF comes before the frontier of the social welfare maximizing allocation in the items’
ordering.
These two frontiers separate the set of items into three groups. Slightly abusing notation, let
vAg and vBg denote the valuations of agents A and B respectively for group g ∈ {1, 2, 3}, where
the group number g is consistent with the initial item ordering. Note that vA1/vB1 ≥ vA2/vB2, and
vA2/vB2 ≥ vA3/vB3. The ratio that we are studying can thus be rewritten as follows:
SW (xPF )
SW (x∗)
=
vA1 + vB2 + vB3
vA1 + vA2 + vB3
= 1− vA2 − vB2
vA1 + vA2 + vB3
. (2)
Let vA2 = kvB2 for some k > 1. Then, vA1 ≥ kvB1. Also, by the definition of PF, since the PF
solution allocates the second group of items to agent B, then vA2
vA1
≤ vB2
vB2+vB3
which, after replacing
for vA2, gives vA1 ≥ k(vB2 + vB3). Since vB2 + vB3 = 1 − vB1, this inequality can be rewritten as
vA1 ≥ k(1 − vB1). Adding this inequality to vA1 ≥ kvB1 yields vA1 ≥ k/2. Also, according to the
definition of k, we get that k(vB1 + vB2) ≤ vA1 + vA2 ≤ 1, or k(1 − vB3) ≤ 1, which yields that
vB3 ≥ (k − 1)/k. Using these lower bounds for vA1 and vB3 in Equation (2), we get:
SW (xPF )
SW (x∗)
≥ 1− (k − 1)vB2
k
2 + kvB2 +
k−1
k
= 1− 2k(k − 1)vB2
2k2vB2 + k2 + 2k − 2 . (3)
The lower bound implied by this inequality is minimized when the fraction on the right hand
side is maximized. Assuming that vB2 is fixed, we take the partial derivative w.r.t. k, which is
equal to: (
2k(k − 1)vB2
2k2vB2 + k2 + 2k − 2
)′
k
=
(
2k2vB2 + 3k
2 − 4k + 2) 2vB2
(2k2vB2 + k2 + 2k − 2)2 .
It is easy to verify that this is positive because 3k2 − 4k + 2 > 0 for any value of k. This means
that for any value of vB2, the fraction is maximized when k is as large as possible. But we know
that kvB2 = vA2 ≤ 1 − vA1, and since vA1 ≥ k/2, this yields k ≤ 1vB2+0.5 . Thus to maximize the
fraction we let k = 1
vB2+0.5
, or vB2 =
2−k
2k . Substituting for vB2 in Inequality (3) yields:
SW (xPF )
SW (x∗)
≥ 1− −k
2 + 3k − 2
4k − 2 ,
with the right hand side minimized for k = 1+
√
3
2 , which proves the theorem.
8If the PF solution dictates that an item has to be shared between the two agents, we can just split it into two
items such that each one is allocated to a different agent without affecting the ordering.
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of Lemma 2. Note that the dictatorial mechanism always provides a social welfare of at least 1
if used (each agent gets a value of exactly 0.5). The second mechanism provides a social welfare
of 2vAvB . We can therefore express the ratio of the social welfare of an allocation xm that is
the outcome of combining these two mechanisms, over the social welfare of the PF allocation as
SW (xm)
SW (xPF )
= 0.5+vAvB
vA+vB
.
We only need to show that 0.5+vAvB
vA+vB
≥ 23 for all vA, vB combinations in [0.5, 1]2 (since it must
be the case that vA, vB ≥ 0.5 in the PF allocation). We treat vB as a given constant and take the
derivative w.r.t. vA. This gives a derivative of
v2
B
−0.5
(vA+vB)2
, which is negative for v2B < 0.5, positive for
v2B > 0.5, and zero for v
2
B = 0.5. This means that, given a value of vB <
√
0.5 ≈ 0.7, the ratio is
minimized for vA = 1, and given a value of vB >
√
0.5 ≈ 0.7, the ratio is minimized for vA = 0.5.
Given the symmetry of the ratio w.r.t. to vA and vB , the exact same argument applies for the
values of vB minimizing the ratio given a value of vA. We conclude that the ratio is minimized
either when vA = 0.5 and vB = 1 or when vA = 1 and vB = 0.5. In either case, the ratio evaluates
to 23 , proving the theorem.
of Lemma 3. Let the PF prices be pt and pb, and note that, since pt + pb = n, either both prices
are integers or neither is. If both prices are integers, it is easy to see that the following allocation
is PF: the first pt bidders are assigned a 1/pt fraction of item t and the remaining pb bidders are
assigned a 1/pb fraction of item b. If neither of the prices is an integer, then we get a PF allocation
by giving each of the first ⌊pt⌋ bidders (the Top bidders) a 1/pt fraction of item t, Bidder ⌈pt⌉ a
pt−⌊pt⌋
pt
fraction of item t and a pb−⌊pb⌋
pb
fraction of item b, and each of the remaining bidders (the
Bottom bidders) a fraction of 1/pb of item b.
Then, if a bidder being allocated a fraction of both the top and the bottom items in the
PF solution exists and her valuation for the top item is v, notice that in that PF solution the
allocation of every Top bidder comprises a fraction of the top item alone; similarly, the allocations
for Bottom bidders come from the bottom item alone. If there are k − 1 Top bidders, then the
price of item t in the PF solution would be equal to k − 1 + x, and that of item b would be equal
to n− k+1− x, where x < 1 is the amount Bidder k spends on item t. Notice that since Bidder k
is interested in both items at these prices, this means that her valuations are the ones defining the
ratio between the two prices (henceforth, we call her the Ratio Defining Bidder, denoted Rb), i.e.:
k − 1 + x
n− k + 1− x = v (4)
Thus:
x =
(n − k + 1)v − (k − 1)
v + 1
. (5)
Every Top bidder gets a fraction of item t equal to the ratio of her budget over the final price
of that item, i.e. a fraction equal to v+1
vn
. Similarly, every Bottom bidder gets a fraction of the
bottom item equal to v+1
n
. Finally, Rb gets a fraction of item t equal to
n−k+1
n
− (k−1)
vn
and a fraction
of item b equal to k
n
− (n−k)v
n
. Notice that if Rb were truthful, then this allocation would offer her
utility equal to v+1
n
, equal to that of every Bottom bidder and of every Top bidder. This utility
is also equal to the utility she would obtain from a v+1
vn
fraction of the top item, or a v+1
n
fraction
of the bottom item.
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of Lemma 5. To verify that this mechanism is truthful, we consider the strategies of any Top
bidder, any Bottom bidder and those of a possible ratio defining bidder.
Top bidders (the same arguments apply for Bottom bidders as well):
• A Top bidder overbids: then her allocation is unchanged.
• A Top bidder underbids but continues to overbid Rb: then her allocation is unchanged.
• A Top bidder underbids Rb and Rb had been forced to share the top item: then the only
possible change is that the Top bidder ends up sharing the bottom item which is something
not even Rb wanted.
• A Top bidder underbids Rb and Rb had been forced to share the bottom item. If Rb does not
move then the ρ for the Bottom bidders is reduced, and hence it is reduced for everyone;
while if Rb moves, then the best option for the Top Bidder is to become the ratio defining
bidder, and the only choice with the underbid is for the Top Bidder to be sharing the bottom
item. But her ρ (= n/[(v + 1)(n − k + 1)]) is smaller than the approximation of Rb which is
the approximation she achieved before.
Ratio Defining Bidder (w.l.o.g. assume that she had been forced to share the top item):
• There is no point in overbidding.
• By underbidding, one possible outcome is that this bidder shares the bottom item along with
those who had already been sharing it, which of course by definition is worse for her.
• By underbidding one of the Bottom bidders this bidder ceases to be ratio defining. The
interesting case is when there is a new ratio defining bidder and she is forced to go up. In
that case, the ρ for that bidder (vn/k(v+1)) is smaller than the approximation of the original
ratio defining bidder and everyone suffers this same ρ.
of Lemma 8. Suppose not for a contradiction. W.l.o.g. suppose that some price is higher in the
outcome of A′ (if not, switch the roles of A and A′).
In the run of the mechanism A′, consider a time when no item has exceeded the final price given
by the mechanism A but some items have reached that price. Let S be the set of items at this point
that have prices equal to their final prices in A. We will show that no item in set S will be part
of the set R from this time onwards in the mechanism A′, and hence the prices of these items will
not increase in A′. Let T ′ and T be the set of bidders who have edges to some item in the set S at
the current prices in A′, and at the final prices in A, respectively. Clearly, T ′ ⊆ T . Also suppose a
bidder b ∈ T has an edge to an item outside set S at the final prices of A; this means that b 6∈ T ′
at the current prices as b will strictly prefer the item outside the set S. Thus if b ∈ T ′, this implies
that b has no edges to an item outside the set S at the final prices given by A, and so in A, b was
allocated to some item in set S. Since we know that at the final prices given by A, all the bidders
can be allocated to some item, this implies that |T ′| ≤ c(S). Thus, even at current prices, all the
bidders in T ′ can be allocated to items in the set S, and hence no item in set S can be part of the
set R. Thus no item can have higher final price in A′ than in A. A contradiction.
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B Improved Mechanisms for Two Items
B.1 Two Bidders
We start by assuming that both bidders are interested in both items, i.e. have non-zero valuation
for both of them; we touch on the other cases at the end of this section.
Just as we did for the many bidder case, we scale their valuations so that both bidders assign
a value of 1 to item b. Then, let u and v be the respective valuations of Bidder A and Bidder B
for item t. W.l.o.g. we can assume that u > 1 and u > v, which means that Bidder A will never
be Rb and Bidder B will be Rb only if v > 1. If no Rb exists, then the PF allocation is clearly
truthful, but when Bidder B is the Ratio Defining Bidder, our 2-bidder 2-item mechanism defines
the final allocation as a function of just v. More specifically, Bidder B gets a fraction b(v) = 1
v
of
item b and a fraction t(v) = 12 − 12v2 of item t. Finally, Bidder A is allocated all of item t that is not
allocated to Bidder B. The intuition behind this mechanism is that, if Bidder B overbids regarding
her valuation for item t, then she loses part of item b.
Theorem 4. The 2-bidder, 2-item mechanism is truthful and achieves an approximation factor of
2 · (√2− 1) ≈ 0.828427 of the PF objective.
Proof. Notice that the valuation of Bidder B would equal t(v¯)v + b(v¯) if her bid is v¯, and for the
mechanism to be truthful we need t(v¯)v+ b(v¯) ≤ t(v)v+ b(v) for all v¯. It is easy to verify that this
holds for our mechanism since the partial derivative of the left hand side w.r.t. v¯ is equal to v−v¯
v¯3
,
and hence v is the optimal solution for Bidder B.
Regarding the approximation ratio, the PF allocation gives a fraction of 12 − 12v of item t and all
of item b to Bidder B, yielding an approximation factor of v
2+1
v2+v
, which is minimized for v = 1+
√
2,
giving ρ = 2 · (√2− 1) ≈ 0.828427.
Other cases. If just one bidder is interested in both items, we can view it as the previous case
with u = ∞ for the bidder interested in only one item. If the bidders are each interested in only
one item, if these are distinct items, the bidders are each allocated the item they want in full. If it
is the same item, they each receive half of it. In all these cases, ρ ≥ 2 · (√2− 1).
B.2 Three Bidders
Theorem 5. There is a truthful mechanism for 3 bidders and 2 items achieving an approximation
factor of (12−√12)/11 ≈ 0.77599.
Proof. Our goal is to find two functions t(v) and b(v) defining the fractions of the top and bottom
items respectively that Rb will be assigned as a function of her valuation v for the top item. Before
we move on to define such functions, we note that if they are functions of v alone, and if Rb obtains
a fraction ρ of her utility in the PF solution, then every other bidder will have to obtain exactly
the same fraction ρ of her PF utility. Were this not the case, we could easily construct an example
where a bidder that gets a different approximation has valuation v− ǫ or v+ ǫ (i.e. she is practically
the same bidder as Rb). In that case, the bidder with the worse approximation would have the
option of changing her bid by at most 2ǫ and securing the better approximation factor. Therefore
every bidder must be offered the same fraction ρ of her PF allocation utility.
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Now we consider the case when the middle bidder is Rb. We assume w.l.o.g. that this bidder
prefers the top item (v ≥ 1). Then, by Equation (4), v ∈ [1, 2). Following the approach used for
the case of two bidders, we consider the following families of functions:
t(v) = α− β 1
v2
and b(v) = γ
1
v
− δ,
where α, β, γ and δ are non-negative constants which we will choose so as to maximize ρ while
ensuring both truthfulness and that the resulting solution can be allocated. More specifically, for
Rb to be truthful, the utility function t(v¯)v + b(v¯) of Rb has to be maximized at v¯ = v, i.e. it is a
necessary condition that:
t′(v)v + b′(v) = 0 ⇒ β 2
v3
v − γ 1
v2
= 0 ⇒ 2β = γ. (6)
Using the fact that 2β = γ, we can now reduce the number of constants to three by replacing
γ. Then, ρ, the approximation factor, will, by definition, be equal to:
ρ =
t(v)v + b(v)
1
3 (v + 1)
⇒ ρ = 3(αv
2 − δv + β)
v2 + v
. (7)
Given t(v) and b(v), the fraction of the top item that remains for the Top bidder is 1 − t(v) and
the fraction of the bottom item that remains for the Bottom bidder is 1− b(v). We need to make
sure that these remaining fractions suffice to provide both the Top and the Bottom bidders with
a ρ-approximation of their PF utilities. These restrictions translate to:
ρ
v + 1
3v
≤ 1− t(v) ⇒ t(v) ≤ 1
2
− b(v)
2v
⇒ (2α − 1)v − δ ≤ 0 (8)
ρ
v + 1
3
≤ 1− b(v) ⇒ b(v) ≤ 1
2
− t(v)v
2
⇒ αv2 − (2δ + 1)v + 3β ≤ 0. (9)
We choose α = 12+
1
4δ, which makes Restriction (8) tight. We choose β = δ which is the smallest
value of β for which b(v) ≥ 0 always. Substituting in Restriction (9) yields:
(
1
2
v2 − v
)
+ δ
(
1
4
v2 − 2v + 3
)
≤ 0. (10)
Note that this constraint is tight at v = 2. The derivative of the left hand side is v−1+ δ(v/2−2),
which is negative at v = 1. Thus, so long as the constraint is satisfied at v = 1, it is satisfied for
all v ∈ [1, 2]. For this, it suffices that 54δ ≤ 12 , i.e. that δ ≤ 25 .
We choose δ = 25 , and then β =
2
5 and α =
3
5 . Substituting in Equation (7) gives:
ρ =
3
(
3
5v
2 − 25v + 25
)
v2 + v
. (11)
It is a simple matter to check that the derivative of ρ is zero at (2 +
√
14)/5 when ρ ≈ 0.89.
Next, we argue that this is the best choice of parameters. Consider the choice of parameters
α = 12 +
1
4δ + α
′, where α′ ≤ 0 (Restriction (8) at v = 2 forces α′ ≤ 0), β = δ + β′ (again, b(2) ≥ 0
and γ = 2β forces β′ ≥ 0), and δ = 25 + δ′ (again, δ′ ≤ 0). Substituting into Restriction (9) with
v = 1 yields:
α′ + 3β′ − 2δ′ ≤ 0. (12)
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Thus any change to the term α2− δv+ β in ρ is negative: any increase due to β′ must be offset by
a decrease of at least 3β′v2 due to α′ and any increase due to −δ′v is similarly offset by a decrease
of 94δ
′v2 + δ′ due to α′, α and β.
The above scheme handles the case that Rb is the middle bidder. Otherwise, w.l.o.g., suppose
that the bottom bidder is Rb (if not, just switch the roles of the bottom and top items). Then for
v ≤ 2, the bottom bidder is assigned the bottom item, and the other two bidders each receive half
the top item. For 2 ≤ v ≤ √12, t(v) = 14 − 1v2 and b(v) = 2v , and the other two bidders each receive
1
4 +
1
v2
of the top item. For v >
√
12, all three bidders receive one third of the top item. The worst
approximation factor occurs at v =
√
12 and it has value (12−√12)/11 ≈ 0.77599.
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